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Abstract
This study develops a new dynamic general equilibrium model to explore the role
of people’s love of novelty in innovation and innovation-based growth. The model
considers (a) an infinitely lived representative consumer who has standard love-of-
variety preferences for differentiated products and additional love-of-novelty pref-
erences for new products, and (b) technological progress driven by two costly and
time-consuming innovation activities, new product development and existing prod-
uct development. We demonstrate that consumer love of novelty is a source of
innovation-based growth, in the sense that economies with a moderate love of nov-
elty can achieve innovation and long-run growth through cycles between periods
in which new product development is active and those in which existing product
development is active. However, if the preference for novelty is too strong—or too
weak—the economy is caught in an underdevelopment trap with less innovation
and no long-run growth. Our results suggest that the love of novelty is a source of
innovation-based growth, but it can lead to an underdevelopment trap if it is too
strong, according to recent empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
It is a commonplace assertion in economics that culture, like institutions and geogra-
phy, is a fundamental cause of cross-country differences in macroeconomic performance
(Acemoglu et al. 2005). However, as Mokyr (2005) argues, it is still unclear, from both
theoretical and empirical perspectives, how and to what extent culture affects such dif-
ferences. Ample literature has explored this question, in consideration of the various
dimensions of culture, such as preferences, entrepreneurial traits, religion, family ties,
and so on.1 In this study, we provide a new approach to this growing research agenda by
shedding light on the love of novelty as an individual cultural preference.
The desire for new ideas, or love of novelty, is widely considered important for in-
novation. For example, Fagerberg (2005, 2013) argues that “‘openness’ to new ideas,
solutions, etc. is essential for innovation” because innovation requires people and firms
to “search widely for new ideas, inputs and sources of inspiration.” Given that innova-
tion is recognized as a major driver of long-run growth in macroeconomics (Romer 1990,
Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992), it is safe to say that there is a
(rough) consensus that love of novelty, at the macro level, is a source of economic growth
and especially innovation-based growth. Somewhat oddly, however, little formal research
has aimed to formally identify the role of people’s love of novelty as a cultural human
trait in terms of macroeconomic performance such as innovation and growth.
We propose a new dynamic general equilibrium framework that helps us understand
how consumer love of novelty affects innovation and innovation-based growth by extending
the canonical growth model with expanding product varieties (Romer 1990, Grossman
and Helpman 1991). In doing so, we incorporate two new features into a class of variety-
expansion growth models, in which innovators of products enjoy a temporary monopoly
(Matsuyama 1999, 2001). An advantage to using this class of models is that new and
old products are clearly distinguished and have separate roles in the equilibrium, which
facilitates the process of modeling love of novelty.2 The first feature is that we assume
that an infinitely lived representative consumer has not only preferences for differentiated
products (“love-of-variety”) but also an additional preference for new products (“love-of-
novelty”). The second feature considers the transformation process by which new goods
become old. We incorporate the well-accepted view that each single innovation involves a
combination of different types of innovation activities, namely, new product development
and existing product development (OECD 2018). Both types involve time and resource
consuming investment activities.3 In our model, as a result, new ideas are first developed
as new products, and they can survive as “old” products when investments in existing
product development succeed.4
1See below for a literature review.
2See also below for more information on this class of growth models.
3This categorization essentially follows the latest Oslo Manual (OECD 2018), which proposes two
general categories of innovation “by comparing both new and improved innovations to the firm’s existing
products.”
4Assuming that the success is uncertain, whether a new product ultimately survives and takes root
in the economy is also uncertain. This is consistent with the nature of technological progress in history,
which often referred to as “technological inertia” (Mokyr 1992). In the history of technological inno-
vation, as Mokyr argues, most societies have exhibited a strong resistance to new ideas, experiencing
technological stasis. As a result, newly developed products and technologies often fail to survive, despite
their ostensible economic superiority. The survival of a new product or technology is a highly uncertain
event, and innovation therefore has ever occurred only cyclically (Mokyr 2000, 2004). Examples include
various products and technologies such as steam engines and the internet; see, for instance, Diamond
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These two new features help us identify a basic role of consumer love of novelty
in aggregate innovation and innovation-based growth. In the model, firms involved in
innovation always swing between investing in new product development and existing
product development. Through the marketplace, then, the relative profitability of these
two investment activities inherently depends on the extent to which the consumer prefers
new products to old products. Specifically, a stronger love of novelty by the consumer
directly encourages firms to invent new products, yet it discourages firms from improving
existing old products to survive in the market equilibrium. Because new and existing
product developments are indispensable for the entire process of innovation, the aggregate
level of innovation depends on a good balance between these two effects. Our analysis
demonstrates the mechanism that creates the ambiguous role of the love of novelty.
We show that the consumer’s love of novelty has a non-monotonic effect on aggregate
innovation and growth. If love of novelty is especially weak, firms invent fewer new
products, even though they are the source of existing product development. Because
each innovation requires new and existing product development to be completed, the
aggregate level of innovation is too small for the economy to achieve long-run growth.
Such an economy is caught in an underdevelopment trap. If, then, the love of novelty is
not small but moderate, both types of innovation perpetually occur along an equilibrium
path, though cyclically. In this case, periods in which new product development occurs
and periods in which existing product development occurs alternate along an equilibrium
path,5 whereby the economy achieves long-run growth through innovation cycles. These
results show that the love of novelty is an essential source of innovation-based growth in
the long run, consistent with conventional wisdom.
In the case of excessive love of novelty, firms eventually invest exclusively in inventing
new products; thus, no improvements to old products occur in the long-run equilibrium.
In this case, the economy is trapped in a situation in which new goods are invented
every period because of new product development, but new goods rarely survive in the
absence of existing product development. As in the case of a weak love of novelty, the
economy loses the balance between the two types of innovation; the aggregate level of
innovation is too low to achieve long-run growth. Thus, the love of novelty also leads to an
underdevelopment trap when it is too strong. Indeed, the overall effect of consumer love
of novelty is ambiguous: moderate love of novelty is a fundamental source of innovation-
based growth (in line with what is generally believed), but excessive love of novelty can
cause an underdevelopment trap.
The theoretical findings above lend support to the widely accepted view that culture
is a fundamental cause of cross-country differences in macroeconomic performance, by
focusing on an important aspect of national culture—the public’s love of novelty. Since
different people or regions typically have different attitudes toward novel things on aver-
age (e.g., Rogers 1962, Tellis et al. 2009), love of novelty as a national characteristic may
be a core determinant of economic growth and development. In line with this prediction,
a recent empirical study by Go¨ren (2017) reports cross-country evidence for a significant
inverted-U relationship between individual traits of seeking novelty and economic devel-
opment. His empirical results suggest that novelty-seeking traits as a cultural trait is a
source of growth and development provided that it is moderate, but it can have a negative
(1997) for more details.
5In the baseline model, an innovative economy is always perpetually cyclical; in Section 5, however,
we show that it can also stably converge to a unique balanced growth path, by considering a natural
extension of the baseline model.
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effect if it is too strong or too weak. This is consistent with our theoretical findings.
We also consider some extensions to the baseline model. Specifically, if we relax the
assumption of a single-period monopoly and instead assume protracted monopoly, as in
the original Romer model,6 we can show that new and existing product development
coexist in equilibrium. In this case, the equilibrium rate of innovation for any period is
an inverted U-shaped function of the consumer’s love of novelty, which confirms our main
finding.
Our study contributes to theoretical literature on innovation cycles by identifying
the love of novelty as a novel factor for cyclical innovation (Judd 1985, Shleifer 1986,
Deneckere and Judd 1992, Gale 1996, Francois and Shi 1999, Matsuyama 1999, 2001, and
Furukawa 2015). In the main analysis, following this theoretical literature, we assume
that the innovator can enjoy only a single-period monopoly, and we demonstrate that
when the love of novelty is moderate, innovation is cyclical on an equilibrium path. On
this cyclical path, the two types of innovations, new and existing product development,
perpetually alternate on an equilibrium path Although this assumption is relaxed in
Section 5, as explained above, it is reasonably justifiable because the duration of patent
protection, or, more generally, monopoly power, can persist for only a finite period of time
in reality. Allowing for a multiperiod monopoly, from a more general perspective, Iwaisako
and Futagami (2007) identify an essential role of the temporary nature of monopoly in
growth cycles in an innovation-based growth model with a finite patent length.7 Our
study extends these by developing a new model of innovation and growth cycles and
characterizing the role of consumer love of novelty as a source of innovation cycles.
Our study also contributes to a growing body of theoretical literature on culture and
growth. Galor and Moav (2002) show that individual preferences for offspring quality play
a role in population growth and human capital formation.8 Subsequent studies by Ashraf
and Galor (2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2017) explore cultural/genetic diversity and regional
development at different stages and in different places.9 Several papers have identified
the ambiguous role of some cultural factors. For example, Ashraf and Galor (2013a) show
an inverted U-shaped relationship between genetic diversity within a country and regional
economic development. Cozzi (1998) considers a cultural asset that is unproductive at the
individual level, traded between different generations, yet has positive external effects on
productivity growth. Then, he shows that culture can be a bubble that causes dynamic
indeterminacy and self-fulfilling stagnation. Thus, the role of culture in his model is
ambiguous in that it can encourage or discourage economic growth.
The studies by Galor and Michalopoulos (2012) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2014) are
6See Segerstrom et al. (1990), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt
(1992).
7See, for instance, Iwaisako and Tanaka (2017) for endogenous growth cycles in an overlapping gen-
erations model.
8A large body of empirical literature is available. Tabellini (2010) shows that cultural propensities
such as trust have a significant effect on regional per-capita income in Europe. Alesina and Giuliano
(2010) examine the effects of family ties on economic performance. See also Be´nabou et al. (2015, 2016),
who show that innovation can be negatively associated with people’s religiosity.
9See also Chu (2007), who provides the notable argument that entrepreneurial overconfidence can
cause different rates of economic growth across countries. Moreover, Chu and Cozzi (2011) focus on
cultural preferences for fertility. In a broader context, as Yano (2009) asserts, the coordination of such
cultural factors with laws and rules is indispensable to deriving high quality markets and thereby healthy
economic growth. This study extends this literature by investigating a composition effect of the public’s
love of novelty and patent on innovation and long-run growth. See also Dastidar and Yano (2017) and
Yano and Furukawa (2019) for recent studies on market quality theory.
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also related to our study. Both studies identify the critical role of entrepreneurial traits
in innovation and economic growth by considering the endogenous evolution of a frac-
tion of people who exhibit entrepreneurial spirit (in terms of risk tolerance). Given that
entrepreneurial traits should be partially attributable to openness to novelty, we can say
that their studies focus on one important aspect of the love of novelty by entrepreneurs.
Our paper contributes to this literature by examining the role of a representative con-
sumer’s love of novelty as a cultural factor in an innovation-based growth model and
identifying the ambiguous role of the love of novelty.10
Literature on two-stage innovation models is also related to our study, and most
models have distinguished basic and applied research (see, e.g., Aghion and Howitt 1996,
Michelacci 2003, Akiyama 2009, Cozzi and Galli 2009, 2013, 2014, Acs and Sanders 2012,
Chu et al. 2012, Chu and Furukawa 2013, Konishi 2015). Because we consider two
separate activities of applied innovation, firms earn profits in both stages of innovation.
This differs from existing models, in which there is no profit in the early, basic research
stages of innovation. Our study thus complements the literature by first considering two
commercial stages of innovation, and then by characterizing the role of consumer love of
novelty on aggregate innovation and growth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model, and Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium dynamics of the model. Section 4
identifies the critical role of the love of novelty in innovation and growth in the long run.
Section 5 provides extensions to the baseline model. Finally, Section 6 offers concluding
remarks.
2 Innovation-Based Growth Model with Love of Nov-
elty
This section presents our basic innovation-based growth model, in which innovation occurs
endogenously as a product of the firms’ profit-seeking R&D investment and thereby the
variety of products increases over time, following Romer (1990). In this section, we
first proceed with the assumption that firms can only enjoy temporary (one period)
monopoly power, as in Matsuyama (1999, 2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2012). This is
assumed because in this class of models, new products and old products play separate
but essential roles in equilibrium, facilitating the modeling of people’s love of novelty—as
will be apparent later. In Section 5, this assumption of a one-period monopoly is relaxed.
To investigate the role of love of novelty of optimizing agents, our model has two
new assumptions. (i) First, we assume that the representative agent is endowed with
the standard love-of-product variety and love of novelty; thus, he/she would have some
extra weight on new products compared with old products.11 Second, (ii) we think of
two types of innovation: one type is to invent new products, and the other type is to
ensure invented products have a long life in the market. We refer to these two types of
innovation as new product development and existing product development, which both
require R&D investment by profit-seeking firms.
10Doi and Mino (2008) also explore the role of consumption-side factors in innovation and innovation-
based growth by focusing on habit formation and consumption externalities.
11In this literature, some models have physical capital accumulation (e.g., Matsuyama 2001). To make
our analysis tractable, we abstract from this aspect because our focus is on preferences for new products,
innovation, and innovation-driven growth.
5
2.1 Consumption and Love of Novelty
An infinitely lived representative agent inelastically supplies L units of labor in each pe-
riod. The representative agent solves the standard dynamic optimization of consumption
and saving over an infinite horizon:
maxU =
∞∑
t=0
βt ln u(t), (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time preference rate, and u(t) is an index of consumption in
period t. We assume that periodic utility u is defined over differentiated consumption
goods, and each is indexed by j.12 Namely, the agent is endowed with so-called love-
of-variety preferences. As is standard, we consider a constant elasticity of substitution
utility function:
u(t) =
(∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
(ε(j, t) x(j, t))
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
, (2)
where x(j, t) is the consumption of good j in period t, σ ≥ 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between any two consumption goods, and ε(j, t) is a variable determining the consumer’s
preference for each good, j. Here, the consumption goods are categorized into two types:
new goods and old goods. Let N(t) be the set of new goods invented in period t and A(t)
be the set of old goods invented prior to period t. To simplify the description, let A(t)
and N(t) also denote the number (measure) of goods.
When considering the innate love of novelty, we assume that the representative agent
is endowed with “love-of-novelty” preferences, in addition to the standard love-of-variety
preferences.
First, we attempt to observe a benchmark in which the consumer prefers new goods
and old goods equally; there is no particular love of novelty. In this case, all goods
should have identical ε(j, t) for all j ∈ A(t)∪N(t). Normalizing this parameter to 1, the
consumer’s utility function can be written as
u(t) =
(∫
j∈A(t)
x(j, t)
σ−1
σ dj+
∫
j∈N(t)
x(j, t)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
(3)
Now, suppose that the consumer has some extra preference, ε, for novelty that he/she
considers in terms of a good being new or a condition in which a good is new:
ε(j, t) =
{
1 if j ∈ A(t) (old goods)
ε if j ∈ N(t) (new goods)
. (4)
Applying (4) to (2), (3) becomes
u(t) =
(∫
j∈A(t)
x(j, t)
σ−1
σ dj+ε
∫
j∈N(t)
x(j, t)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
. (5)
12This follows Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 3). In our model, thus, the variety of consumption
goods endogenously increases over time, unlike in the original Romer model (in which the variety of
intermediate goods increases). Therefore, in our model, patents are granted for consumption goods, but
they are often for intermediate goods in reality. Nevertheless, we adopt the present setting because we
are interested in modeling consumers’ love of novelty. Notably, however, we can obtain similar results
even if we consider an expanding variety of intermediate goods.
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When ε = 1, first, the consumer has no preference for novelty and prefers all goods
equally, as in (3). This provides the benchmark, which has been intensively investigated
in the literature. When ε > 1, the consumer has a love of novelty and prefers new goods
to old goods. The higher ε, the stronger the love of novelty. To retain generality, we also
allow for ε < 1. When ε < 1, the consumer’s love of novelty is very weak, or we can say
that the consumer has a so-called “fear of novelty” (Barber 1961), preferring old goods
to new goods. This sort of negative preference for novelty can also be observed in reality
and develops from people’s innate “mental resistance to new ideas” (Beveridge 1959).
For simplicity, we refer to ε as the consumer’s love of novelty for all ε > 0.13
The infinitely lived consumer solves the static optimization in (1); as is well known,
we have the demand functions:
x(j, t) = ε(j, t)σ−1
E(t)p(j, t)−σ
P (t)1−σ
, (6)
where the consumer’s spending on differentiated goods is:
E(t) ≡
∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
p(j, t)x(j, t)dj, (7)
P (t) is the usual price index, defined as
P (t) ≡
(∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
(p(j, t)/ε(j, t))1−σdj
) 1
1−σ
, (8)
and p(j, t) is the price of good j in period t. By solving the dynamic optimization, we
also obtain the Euler equation:14
E(t+ 1)
E(t)
= β(1 + r(t)), (9)
where r(t) denotes the interest rate.
2.2 Production
A continuum of firms produces consumption goods j ∈ A(t) ∪ N(t). Each good j, a
new or old good, is dominated by a monopolistic producer. We consider a one-for-one
technology in goods production. Namely, any producer, j ∈ A(t) or N(t), hires x(j, t)
units of labor to produce x(j, t) units of good j, and monopolistically sells them to the
consumer. The marginal cost is, thus, equal to the wage rate, w(t).
As shown in (6), the consumption good producers, j ∈ A(t) ∪ N(t), face a constant
price elasticity of market demand, equal to σ ≥ 1. The unconstrained mark-up for a
monopolistic producer is σ/(σ − 1) > 1. Thus, the mark-up goes to infinity in a Cobb-
Douglas case of σ = 1. Nevertheless, to observe the role of substitutability between goods,
13In this study, we exclude any possibility of ε < 0 because this is a trivial case, in which case the
consumer obtains disutility from buying new products and thus simply chooses x(j, t) = 0 for all j ∈ N(t).
14Here we consider the standard lifetime budget constraint as follows: E(t + 1) + Q(t + 1) = (1 +
r(t))Q(t) +W (t)L, where Q(t) denotes the value of financial assets (i.e., equity of monopolistic firms)
owned by the representative consumer.
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captured by σ, in detail, we allow for the case of σ = 1,15 by introducing an upper bound
of the mark-up, say, µ > 1. This upper bound µ has often been called a so-called patent
breadth (see, e.g., Li 2001, Goh and Olivier 2002, Iwaisako and Futagami 2013, Chu et al.
2016).16 Following the literature, we assume µ ≤ σ/(σ − 1).17 Notably, this introduction
of a mark-up upper bound, µ, is only for clarifying what occurs in the Cobb-Douglas case
(σ = 1). Thus, the main results do not alter qualitatively at all without the upper bound
µ.
Accordingly, each firm sets a monopolistic price at:
p(j, t) = µw(t) (10)
for all j. Using (4), (6), and (10), the output and monopolistic profit for a new good are
given by:
x(j, t) =
εσ−1E(t)
P (t)1−σ
(µw(t))−σ ≡ xn(t) for j ∈ N(t) (11)
and
pi(j, t) = εσ−1
µ− 1
µσ
E(t)
(
w(t)
P (t)
)1−σ
≡ pin(t) for j ∈ N(t). (12)
Equation (12) shows that when σ > 1, the profit for a new good, pin(t), increases with
the love of novelty ε and the total expenditure, E(t), and decreases with the real wage,
w(t)/P (t). When σ = 1 (the Cobb-Douglas case with no substitutability between goods),
additionally, it becomes independent of the love of novelty ε, and the real wage, w(t)/P (t).
We can also derive the output and monopolistic profit for an old good, from (4), (6),
and (10):
x(j, t) =
E(t)
P (t)1−σ
(µw(t))−σ ≡ xa(t) for j ∈ A(t) (13)
and
pi(j, t) =
µ− 1
µσ
E(t)
(
w(t)
P (t)
)1−σ
≡ pia(t) for j ∈ A(t). (14)
The profit pia(t) associated with an old good is always free from the love of novelty ε.
2.3 Innovation
In this section, we present two types of innovation. One type of innovation is to invent
new goods, and the other type is to ensure that invented goods have a long life in the
market; we label these two types of innovation new product development and existing
product development, respectively. First, R&D firms invent new consumption goods. We
suppose new goods will become obsolete without further investments. Then, firms would
15When σ = 1, consumption goods are not substitutes but independent goods. Thus, if one needs to
examine the role of goods substitutability, it is useful to think of the case without substitutability (i.e.,
the case of σ = 1).
16The breadth of a patent here is identified with “the flow rate of profit available to the patentee”
and often interpreted as “the ability of the patentee to raise price” (Gilbert and Shapiro 1990). We can
easily justify the existence of a price upper bound, or patent breadth, by considering potential imitators
whose production cost increases with patent breadth, µ. In a different context, µ can also be considered
a result of price regulation (Evans et al. 2003).
17Notably, as shown later, our result can hold when µ = σ/(σ − 1), that is, when there is no upper
bound of a mark-up.
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invest in existing product development for survival. If investments succeed, new goods
would survive to become “old” goods.18
2.3.1 New Product Development
There is a potentially infinite number of R&D firms. A firm can invent a new good in
period t by making an investment of 1/A(t− 1) units of labor in period t− 1. We follow
Romer (1990) to consider “external effects arising from knowledge spillovers” of the stock
of existing technologies, represented by A(t−1). For simplicity, there is no spillover from
newly invented goods, because we suppose that they are so new that their information
would not be diffused well. Nevertheless, even if we allow for new goods in the stock of
existing technologies, the main results will not qualitatively change. Firms that invent
new goods earn a monopolistic profit in period t, pin(t).
As aforementioned, in the baseline model, we assume that the monopolistic firm can
enjoy only a temporary (one-period) monopoly, following some endogenous growth models
such as Francois and Shi (1999), Matsuyama (1999, 2001), and Acemoglu et al. (2012).
The free entry condition for new product development can be written as:
W n(t− 1) ≡
pin(t)
1 + r(t− 1)
−
w(t− 1)
A(t− 1)
≤ 0 for t ≥ 1 (15)
whereW n(t−1) denotes the discounted present value of inventing a new good. RN(t−1)
denotes the units of labor devoted to new product development in period t− 1. Then, we
have
N(t) = A(t− 1)RN(t− 1). (16)
2.3.2 Existing Product Development
Due to the one-period nature of monopoly power, the new goods, N(t), invented in period
t can potentially be manufactured by any firm in the subsequent period, t+1. The goods
are, at this point, no longer new but “old.” We assume that each new good can be obsolete
before becoming an old good unless investments for survival are made and succeed. We
call this type of innovation for survival existing product development.
Specifically, an R&D firm engaging in existing product development invests one unit
of labor in period t and searches through the set of the new goods, N(t). From among
N(t), the firm then successfully makes χ(t) units of new goods survive to become old
goods, and enjoys a one-period monopoly for those χ(t) goods to earn the profits of
χ(t)pia(t+1). The free entry condition for existing product development can be given as:
W a(t) ≡
χ(t)pia(t+ 1)
1 + r(t)
− w(t) ≤ 0 for t ≥ 0, (17)
in which W a(t) denotes the discounted present value for existing product development.
Concerning χ(t), we consider a simple technology, χ(t) ≡ κN(t), in which κ ∈ (0, 1) is a
18Our two types of innovations basically correspond to the standard categories of innovations, namely,
product innovation and business process innovation (OECD 2018).
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productivity parameter.19 With this function, we assume that firms can find more new
goods when there are more new goods N(t) in the marketplace.
Through this process, the new goods of N(t) are partially converted into the old
goods, whose number is expressed as A(t+1)−A(t). Denote as RA(t) the units of labor
devoted to existing product development in period t. Then we have
A(t+ 1)− A(t) = χ(t)RA(t) ≤ N(t). (18)
For simplicity, we assume that none of the old goods becomes obsolete, although it is
easy to allow for some depreciation for A(t) without rendering any essential change to
the result. For descriptive purposes, we define ρ(t) as a macroeconomic rate at which
new goods survive to be transformed into old goods:
ρ(t+ 1) ≡ χ(t)RA(t)/N(t). (19)
In the subsequent period, t+2, due to the temporary monopoly again, the “new” old
goods, A(t+ 1)−A(t), could potentially be produced by any firm. We follow Acemoglu
et al. (2012) by assuming that monopoly rights will be, then, allocated randomly to
a firm from the pool of potential firms whose ownership belongs to the representative
agent. Thus, the monopoly profits for these “new” old goods will be transferred to new
monopolistic firms owned by the representative agent.20 Consequently, in our model, all
goods are monopolistically competitively produced in equilibrium, and their profits are
allocated to the representative agent as dividends.21
2.4 Labor Market
As shown in (12) and (14), the real wage w(t)/P (t) is a critical component of the profits.
Thus, having the following is beneficial:
w(t)
P (t)
=
1
µ
[
A(t) + εσ−1N(t)
] 1
σ−1 , (20)
which uses p(j, t) = µw(t) for any j ∈ A(t) ∪ N(t) with (8). The labor market clearing
condition is:
L =
∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
x(j, t)dj +RN(t) +RA(t). (21)
The left side in (21) denotes the labor supply, and the right side denotes the labor demand
for production, new product development RN(t), and existing product development RA(t)
in each period t. It is useful to derive the labor demand from the production sector as∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
x(j, t)dj =
1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
, (22)
19From a broader perspective, this κ can relate to firms’ absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal
1989). See also Aghion and Jaravel (2015) for a recent contribution, in consideration of the role of
absorptive capacity in innovation and growth.
20The financial asset Q(t) owned by the consumer (in the form of equity of monopolistic firms) earns
the return rate, r(t), in each period, t; see footnote 14. As is standard in the canonical innovation-based
growth model, this earning is from the profits of all monopolistic firms (in the form of dividends).
21Alternatively, we could also proceed in such a manner that goods are sold at a perfectly competitive
price (e.g., Matsuyama 2001). However, we understand that this option would complicate the analysis
without garnering new insights. In addition, the interaction between monopolistic and competitive
sectors is notable but beyond our scope. Thus, in this paper, we ensure the analysis as simple as possible
to highlight the main topic discussed in the introduction.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Lemma 1
which uses (11), (13), (20), and (21).
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
We are now ready to derive the dynamical system that characterizes the law of motion
for the equilibrium trajectory of the economy. In doing this, it is beneficial to define
n(t) ≡ N(t)/A(t), which is the ratio of new to old goods. By using the free entry
conditions in (15) and (17), along with (12) and (14), we derive the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Only new product development occurs in equilibrium when n(t) < εσ−1/κ.
Only existing product development occurs when n(t) > εσ−1/κ.
Proof. Suppose that firms invest in new product development in equilibrium. Then, the
free entry condition (15) must hold with equality (giving firms a zero net payoff). With
(12), (14), (17), and (20), this equality implies n(t) ≤ εσ−1/κ.Where n(t) < εσ−1/κ, that
is, (17) holds with inequality, there is no investment in existing product development in
equilibrium. Using this information, we can easily prove the first half of the lemma. An
analogous proof can be applied to the second half.
The result of Lemma 1 is presented in Figure 1. The cut-off level of n(t), εσ−1/κ, generates
two regimes in the economy. The first regime corresponds to n(t) ∈ (0, εσ−1/κ), which
we call a new product development regime. The second regime corresponds to n(t) ∈
(εσ−1/κ,∞), which we call an existing product development regime. At the cut-off point,
the economy includes both activities; however, we can ignore it, because the point has
zero measure.
As shown in Lemma 1, a type of specialization occurs in this model. In reality, any
economy appears to be engaged in both new and existing product development, more
or less, at any point in time. We can easily remove this unrealistic aspect concerning
specialization from the model by, as we do in Section 5, allowing the innovator a long-
lived monopoly or simply introducing an exogenous growth factor. As will be apparent
later, either change to the baseline model could provide another interesting analysis but
result in the analysis being less tractable. Thus we adopt the present setting for simplicity.
In each period, t, the value of n(t) should be supposed to be given, because it is a
pre-determined (stock) variable. In a hypothetical situation in which n(t) is taken as
given, Lemma 1 implies that, for a given n(t), an economy is more likely to engage in
new product development if (and only if) the love of novelty, ε, is stronger and/or the
productivity for existing product development, κ, is lower. This is because there is a
higher relative profit for the invention of a new good, compared with the investment
in existing goods’ survival, when the consumer prefers new goods to old goods more
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Figure 2: New Product Development Regime
strongly (due to larger ε) and/or the cost for survival investments is higher (due to lower
κ). The development of technologies that earn a higher profit is encouraged in market
equilibrium. For the analogous reason, an economy is more likely to engage in existing
product development when εσ−1/κ is smaller, in which case there is a higher relative
profit for survival investments.
3.1 New Product Development Regime
With n(t) < εσ−1/κ, by Lemma 1, the economy falls into the new product development
regime. With (9), (15), (12), and (20), the free entry condition for invention, W n(t) = 0,
becomes:
N(t+ 1) =
A(t)
εσ−1
[
βεσ−1
µ/(µ− 1)
E(t)
w(t)
− 1
]
, (23)
which uses A(t + 1) = A(t) (or ρ(t + 1) = 0). Given A(t), this describes a profit-motive
aspect of the inventive activity: the larger the discounted profit from selling new goods
((βεσ−1(µ − 1)/µ)E(t)/w(t)), the greater the incentives for firms to invent a new good.
The profit for a new good increases as the wage-adjusted expenditure E(t)/w(t) increases
and as the consumer’s love of novelty ε increases. Additionally, when n(t) < εσ−1/κ, no
firm has an incentive to invest in existing product development; in such a case, RA(t) = 0.
The labor market condition (21), thus, becomes:
N(t+ 1) = A(t)
[
L−
1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
]
, (24)
which uses (16) and (22). GivenA(t), the greater the wage-adjusted expenditure E(t)/w(t),
the more resources will be devoted to production, leaving fewer resources for innovation,
resulting in a smaller N(t+ 1).
Figure 2 depicts (23) and (24) and is labeled with FE and LE, respectively, which
determine the equilibrium number of new goods, N(t+1), and the wage-adjusted expen-
diture, E(t)/w(t), as a unique intersection. Given the predetermined variable, A(t), new
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goods, N(t + 1), is increasing in the time preference rate β, the labor force L, and the
patent breadth µ, all of which are natural effects.
The effect of the elasticity of substitution between goods, σ ≥ 1, is more complex and
is positive if the consumer has a love of novelty, that is, if ε > 1. Because σ determines
the level of goods substitutability, a higher σ generally leads to a larger demand for a
preferable good (relative to a less preferred good). Thus, with the consumer’s love of
novelty (ε > 1), the elasticity of substitution σ positively affects N(t + 1) through an
upward shift of the FE curve in Figure 2, by increasing the expenditure share for a new
good and thereby its profit. However, in the benchmark case of ε = 1, comprising neither
a love or fear of novelty, the elasticity of substitution σ has no role because all goods,
both new and old, are equally desirable for the consumer and thus their demands/profits
are also equal. When the consumer has a fear of novelty, that is, ε < 1, the effect of σ on
N(t+1) is negative because old goods are now preferable. Again, a higher substitutability
σ leads to a larger demand for a preferable good, in general. Thus, in this fear-of-novelty
case, higher σ generates a downward shift of the FE curve, by decreasing the profits for
new goods (and increasing the profits for old goods).
As for the love of novelty ε, a higher ε causes an upward shift in the FE curve in
the standard case of σ > 1, where goods are substitutes. This result is simply because
the demand for a new good becomes larger if the consumer prefers new goods to old
goods more strongly (higher ε). Then, the equilibrium profit for new goods, (βεσ−1(µ−
1)/µ)E(t)/w(t), is also larger.22 The upward shift of the FE curve leads to an increase
in N(t + 1) in equilibrium. In the special case of σ = 1 (where goods are independent
goods), ε has no role because the expenditure share for any independent good, new or
old, is constant, and free from ε.
We can formally confirm this effect of ε by solving (23) and (24):
N(t+ 1) = ΘA(t), (25)
where
Θ ≡
εσ−1(µ− 1)L− 1/β
εσ−1 ((µ− 1) + 1/β)
. (26)
Equation (25) determines the equilibrium amount of new goods in the new product
development regime. The coefficient Θ is increasing in the love of novelty ε and the
standard parameters β, L, and µ. We can interpret the parameter composite Θ as the
potential demand for new goods. Assuming Θ > 0, we exclude a trivial case where
there is no invention of new goods in any situation, by imposing εσ−1β(µ − 1)L > 1,
which provides a lower bound of ε as [1/(β(µ − 1)L)]1/(σ−1) ≡ ε0. Additionally, because
RA(t) = 0 and thus ρ(t + 1) = 0 in the present regime, from (18), the old goods do
not increase; A(t + 1) = A(t). Therefore, we easily verify that if Θ > εσ−1/κ holds,
N(t+1)/A(t+1) ≡ n(t+1) > εσ−1/κ holds, whereby the economy moves to the existing
product development regime in period t+1. Conversely, if Θ < εσ−1/κ, n(t+1) < εσ−1/κ.
Then, the economy is trapped in the new product development regime. In this situation,
N(t) and A(t) are constant over time, resulting in less innovation in the sense that there
is only one type of innovation, that is, new product development, N(t). Consequently,
there is no long-run growth because the variety of goods, N(t) + A(t), is constant over
time.
22See also (12).
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Figure 3: Existing Product Development Regime
Lemma 2 The economy is trapped in the new product development regime if and only if
Θ < εσ−1/κ.
3.2 Existing Product Development Regime
With n(t) > εσ−1/κ, by Lemma 1, the economy is in the existing product development
regime in period t; RA(t) ≥ 0, and RN(t) = 0. Rearranging the labor market condition
(21), with (22), yields the survival rate for new goods as:
ρ(t+ 1) = κRA(t) = κ
(
L−
1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
)
. (27)
Analogous to (24), (27) captures the trade-off on resources between the production of
goods and the investment in existing product development. With (9), (14), and (17), the
free entry condition W a(t) = 0 becomes
ρ(t+ 1) =
κβ
µ/(µ− 1)
E(t)
w(t)
−
A(t)
N(t)
, (28)
which uses N(t + 1) = RN(t) = 0 from (16) and A(t + 1) = A(t) + χ(t)RA(t) = A(t) +
χ(t)ρ(t + 1)/κ from (18). Naturally, the transformation rate ρ(t + 1) increases with the
discounted profit from producing the old good (β(µ− 1)/µ)E(t)/w(t) and also increases
with the number of new goods N(t), because R&D firms can find more inventions (i.e.,
opportunities for improvement). Figure 3 illustrates how ρ(t + 1) is determined by (27)
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and (28). Solving (27) and (28), we obtain:23
ρ(t+ 1) = min
{
1
1 + β (µ− 1)
(
κβ (µ− 1)L−
A(t)
N(t)
)
, 1
}
. (29)
Using (29), with (18), the growth of old goods is as follows:
A(t+ 1) = A(t)min
{
β (µ− 1)
1 + β (µ− 1)
(
1 + κL
N(t)
A(t)
)
, 1 +
N(t)
A(t)
}
(30)
In the present regime, the new goods do not increase; N(t+1) = 0 from (16). This result
implies n(t+ 1) = 0, which is clearly lower than εσ−1/κ. We therefore have Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 The existing product development regime is always unstable; thus, the economy
necessarily shifts to the new product development regime.
4 The Role of Love of Novelty in Innovation and
Long-run Growth
In this section, we examine the effects of consumers’ love of novelty on innovation and
growth in the long run. We follow the standard literature to assume σ > 1.24 Lemma 2
shows that in the case with Θ < εσ−1/κ, the economy is fatally caught in the trap without
existing product development, in which no long-run growth is possible because new goods
N(t) and old goods A(t) are constant. In such a trapped economy, the inventive potential
Θ is relatively low, and the consumer’s love of novelty, ε, is relatively strong. On the one
hand, the new product development regime is larger due to a high ε; on the other hand,
the invention flow N(t) within the regime tends to be low, due to a low Θ. These two
effects are negative on innovation; thus, the economy with Θ < εσ−1/κ is trapped. To
avoid traps, Θ > εσ−1/κ must hold as shown in Lemma 3. As is common in the standard
R&D-based growth model, traps can be avoided only if labor is sufficiently abundant.25
Specifically, we assume the following condition:
23Notably, ρ(t + 1) > 0 always holds, due to εσ−1β(µ − 1)L > 1. When ρ(t + 1) = 1 holds in (29),
all new goods survive in period t+ 1. In this case, the free entry condition (28) does not hold anymore;
the labor market condition (27), with ρ(t+ 1) = 1, would determine the equilibrium value of the wage-
adjusted expenditure, E(t)/w(t). Whether ρ(t+1) < 1 or ρ(t+1) = 1 occurs in equilibrium, our results
do not alter qualitatively. Only for reference, it is notable that ρ(t + 1) < 1 occurs if and only if
κL < 1 + 1/(β (µ− 1)).
24If σ = 1, the consumption goods are independent goods; thus, the expenditure share between new
and old goods is constant, and free from love of novelty ε. Notably, under σ = 1, the condition in Lemma
2 becomes independent of ε.
25This is due to the well-known scale effect within the model. Although the existence of the scale
effect has been empirically rejected from a long-run perspective, by using 100 years of data (Jones 1995),
it might play a role in world development in the very long run: As Boserup (1965) argues, population
growth often triggers the adoption of new technology, because people are forced to adopt new technology
when their population becomes too large to be supported by existing technology. The empirical finding
of Kremer (1993) also suggests that total research output increases with population. Consistent with
these views, Lemma 4 shows that population size affects technological progress in the long run. The
threshold level of L in (31), L0, comprises several parameters. Because, for instance, L0 decreases with
κ, the productivity of firms has a role in avoiding traps, which is natural and intuitive.
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L > 2
√
1
κ
(
1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
)
1
β (µ− 1)
≡ L0. (31)
Lemma 4 Under (31), there exist threshold values ε+ > ε− > ε0 for which
Θ > εσ−1/κ ⇐⇒ ε ∈ (ε−, ε+).
Proof. From (26), we can show that Θ > εσ−1/κ if and only if
F (εσ−1) ≡
1
κ
(
1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
)(
εσ−1
)2
− Lεσ−1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
< 0. (32)
Because F is quadratic and convex in εσ−1, (32) is possible only when F (x) = 0 has two
distinct real roots. The positiveness of the discriminant ensures this, that is,
D ≡ L2 −
4
κ
(
1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
)
1
β (µ− 1)
> 0, (33)
which is equivalent to (31). Suppose that (31) holds and let the solutions to F (x) = 0
be εσ−1− < ε
σ−1
+ .
26 As is easily verified, εσ−1+ > 0 holds. Because F (0) > 0, ε
σ−1
− > 0 also
holds. To prove that εσ−10 = 1/(β(µ − 1)L) < ε
σ−1
− , it suffices to show that F (ε
σ−1
0 ) > 0
and F ′(εσ−10 ) < 0. In fact,
F (εσ−10 ) =
1
κ
(
1 +
1
β(µ− 1)
)(
εσ−10
)2
> 0,
F ′(εσ−10 ) =
2
κ
(
1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
)
1
βL (µ− 1)
− L =
1
2L
(L20 − L
2) < 0.
Because the solution set to F (x) < 0 is (εσ−1− , ε
σ−1
+ ), with ε0 < ε−, any ε ∈ (ε−, ε+)
satisfies both ε > ε0 and the no-trap condition. Conversely, any ε > ε0 outside of this
interval violates the no-trap condition.
Condition (31) is indispensable for our analysis. Notably, there exists an ε > ε0
that satisfies the no-trap condition, Θ > εσ−1/κ, if and only if (31) holds.27 Thus, in
the following analysis, we assume (31) to avoid the trivial case of any economies getting
trapped in the no-innovation situation.
Lemma 4 characterizes the parameter range in which the economy has the potential
to innovate and grow in the long run. Lemma 4 also states that the role of love of novelty
ε in achieving Θ > εσ−1/κ is ambiguous because Θ is increasing in ε, which generates
two opposite effects of ε. On the one hand, (a) a higher ε makes the invention of new
goods profitable relative to the investment in existing product development. As a result
of this relative profitability effect, the new product development regime (0, εσ−1/κ) will
become large, whereby the economy is more likely to become trapped in the new product
development regime. However, (b) a higher ε also leads to a larger potential demand
Θ, and there are more new goods N(t) to be created in the new product development
26εσ−1− =
L−
√
D
(2/κ)(1+1/(β(µ−1))) , ε
σ−1
+ =
L+
√
D
(2/κ)(1+1/(β(µ−1))) .
27The sufficiency of (31) is proven in Lemma 4. Notably, D ≤ 0 ⇔ L ≤ L0. (31) is also necessary
because quadratic inequality (32) has no solution if L ≤ L0.
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regime. This leaves more incentives for firms to engage in existing product development,
noting that new goods are the essential source of existing product development. With this
positive indirect effect of ε, the economy is more likely to jump out of the new product
development region. These two opposite effects interact to create an equilibrium role for
ε. The following two propositions show that the role of the love of novelty ε in innovation
is also ambiguous.
Proposition 1 When the infinitely lived consumer’s love of novelty ε is moderate, such
that ε ∈ (ε−, ε+), the economy achieves long-run growth, through perpetual cycles between
periods of new product development and existing product development.
Proof. For ε ∈ (ε−, ε+), because of Lemmas 2 and 4, Θ > ε
σ−1/κ holds and the new
product development regime is always explosive. Thus, any path starting from initial
values lower than εσ−1/κ eventually moves toward the existing product development
regime. Then, because of Lemma 3, the economy will necessarily go back to some point
within the new product development regime. Therefore, if ε is moderate, the economy
perpetually fluctuates, moving back and forth between the two regimes. In this case,
innovation occurs perpetually and cyclically because both Nt and At permanently grow
over time, but alternately.
Proposition 1 suggests that the love of novelty ε can be a source of innovation-driven
growth in the long run, because there are permanently expanding goods spaces, N(t)
and A(t). Innovation-driven growth occurs here because the aforementioned two opposite
effects of ε can be balanced well in a moderate range of ε. However, if the level is extreme,
the love of novelty ε can be a cause of underdevelopment traps rather than the source of
growth, by depressing innovation.
Proposition 2 When the infinitely lived consumer’s love of novelty ε is sufficiently weak
or strong, such that ε /∈ (ε−, ε+), a globally stable equilibrium trap occurs in which new
products are invented but none can survive in the market, due to the absence of existing
product development. The economy fails to achieve long-run growth.
Proof. For ε /∈ (ε−, ε+), because of Lemmas 2 and 4, Θ ≤ ε
σ−1/κ holds and the
new product development regime is a trap. Because of Lemma 3, the existing product
development regime is always explosive, and any path starting from any point in either
regime is eventually trapped in the new product development regime.
Proposition 2 implies that the “fear of novelty” (Beveridge 1959, Barber 1961) and
love of novelty may both cause an economy to fall into an underdevelopment trap. It is
straightforward to understand that the consumer’s fear of novelty negatively affects inno-
vation. Intuitively, with a smaller ε, the consumer has a smaller demand for new products
N(t), implying smaller N(t). Because new goods are the input for existing product de-
velopment, a smaller N(t) discourages existing product development by lowering its net
benefit, which comes from the aforementioned effect (b). As a result, with a strong fear
of novelty, or a very low ε, the economy is more likely to be caught in the trap, in which
investments in new product development occur and investments in existing product de-
velopment do not occur. Because both types of innovative investments are essential, the
numbers of new goods and old goods, N(t) and A(t), are constant over time. Thus, a very
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weak of love of novelty, or a strong fear of novelty, can cause the underdevelopment trap
of no long-run growth. This result is consistent with the historical view in Mokyr (2000),
who considers that the lack of “receptivity of a society to new technological ideas”is “an
integral part of underdevelopment.”The innate fear of novelty for consumers should be
an important source of the absence of receptivity.
Equally important, Proposition 2 also identifies the negative role of a too strong love
of novelty. This role may seem counter-intuitive but the mechanism is natural. Due
to effect (b), a high ε encourages new product development, providing more new goods
N(t). Then, it further encourages existing product development, because existing product
development uses new goods as input. However, due to effect (a), ε increases the relative
profitability of new product development to existing product development. When ε is
very high, this relative profitability effect dominates the positive one to take away from
firms any incentives for existing product development. In this case, only new product
development occurs in equilibrium. The economy is trapped again, in which N(t) and
A(t) are constant over time. Thus, no long-run growth is observed in an economy with a
too strong love of novelty.
Those two propositions identify the ambiguous role of the consumer’s love of novelty
in innovation and innovation-based growth. The following theorem provides a summary.
Theorem 1 When the love of novelty is moderate, it is the fundamental source of innovation-
based economic growth in the long run. However, a too strong love of novelty and a too
weak love of novelty causes an underdevelopment trap, in which new goods are invented
(due to the presence of new product development) but do not survive (due to the absence
of existing product development). In the trapped situation, the total number of goods,
N(t) + A(t), is constant over time; there is no long-run growth.
Proof. Proven in the text by using Propositions 1 and 2.
In Theorem 1, we identify an ambiguous role of the public’s love of novelty in inno-
vation and innovation-based economic growth. Intuitively, the love of novelty encourages
the invention of new goods, but each innovation also involves investments for the sur-
vival of those invented (existing) goods. Thus, innovation at the aggregate level can be
maximized with a good balance between new and existing product development. This is
why the role of love of novelty is ambiguous; a too weak and a too strong love of novelty
depresses innovation, whereby the economy can be caught in underdevelopment traps
with no long-run growth. In summary, we conclude that the love of novelty is a source
of innovation-based growth but can become a cause of underdevelopment traps when too
strong. The threshold values of the love of novelty ε determine which case occurs and are
formally derived in Lemma 4.
As we already mentioned in the introduction, our theoretical predictions are in line
with recent empirical evidence, showing a significant inverted-U relationship between indi-
vidual traits of seeking novelty and economic development (Go¨ren 2017).28 The evidence
suggests that novelty-seeking traits as a cultural trait concerning the love of novelty is a
source of growth and development given that it is moderate, but it has a negative effect
if it is too strong or too weak. This is consistent with our theoretical findings.
As shown in Appendix A, we also observe suggestive evidence that supports our result.
First, using cross-country data, we observe inverted U-shaped relationships between the
28See also Furukawa et al. (2018, 2019) for other supporting evidence.
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love of novelty and innovation. This result is consistent with our theoretical finding of
the ambiguous role of love of novelty in innovation. Second, we also observe a positive
relationship between the love of novelty and the level of originality of innovations at the
country level. Assuming new product development generates more original innovations
than existing product development, the evidence suggests a positive effect of the love of
novelty on new product development. As explained, the positive effect on new product
development is the key mechanism for our theoretical result. All in all, the cross-country
patterns may support the relevance of our theory.
5 Extensions
In this section, we explore two extensions to our baseline model. First, our economy
features only trap and cycle in dynamic equilibrium. By introducing an exogenous growth
factor into the baseline model, we show that the model can have a balanced growth
equilibrium similar to the standard growth model. Second, for analytical tractability, we
assume the one-period nature of monopoly power. We relax this assumption and allow
for a long lived monopoly, whereby the model is more similar to the canonical R&D-based
growth models (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992). In
these extensions, our main message continues to hold: a too strong love or fear of novelty
can depress innovation and economic growth in the long run. Notably, these extensions
also resolve another limitation of the baseline model, by generating a new equilibrium in
which new and existing development coexist.
5.1 Balanced Growth and Path Dependence
To allow for a balanced growth equilibrium, we add minimal elements to the process
of innovation. Following Anderlini et al. (2013), we introduce an exogenous growth
factor, η(t) ≥ 0, into new product development;29 the number of endogenously invented
goods, A(t)RN(t), together with the number of exogenously given ones, η(t), determine
the dynamics of new goods by N(t + 1) = A(t)RN(t) + η(t). This captures so-called
“invention by accident,” which sometimes occurs in reality.30 Without any intended
investments or efforts, researchers can simply create new ideas by accident or mistake
as a by-product of regular, intentional research activity. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume η(t) = ηN(t), with η ∈ [0, 1).31 WhenW n(t) = 0, the new good N(t) thus evolves
in the new product development regime due to
N(t+ 1) = ΘA(t) + ηN(t), (34)
29Exogenous growth factors are often assumed in research for a deeper understanding of the role of
technological progress in various phenomena; see, for instance, Lucas and Moll (2014) and Benhabib et
al. (2017). Given that our goal in this paper is to investigate the cause of innovation, our extended
model still has the endogenous component, RN (t), which is more in accordance with Anderlini et al.
(2013), who consider endogenous and exogenous growth factors in the process of technological progress.
30See, for example, Middendorf (1981) for more details on this type of innovation.
31If η > 1, the new good, N(t), autonomously expands without the help of endogenous new product
development. Given the focus of our paper, we should restrict the exogenous growth factor to be lower
than 1; η < 1.
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Figure 4: Cycles and Global Traps
which corresponds to (25). When W a(t) = 0, the free entry condition similar to (28) is
now
ρ(t+ 1) =
κβ
µ/(µ− 1)
E(t)
w(t)
−
A(t)
N(t)
− ηεσ−1, (35)
which uses N(t + 1) = ηN(t) because RN(t) = 0. From (27) and (35), in the existing
product development regime, the old good A(t) evolves due to
ρ(t+ 1) =
1
1 + β (µ− 1)
(
β (µ− 1)κL−
A(t)
N(t)
− ηεσ−1
)
.32 (36)
Combining (34) and (36), we can derive the equilibrium dynamic system as:
n(t+ 1) =
{
ηn(t) + Θ ≡ ϕN(n(t)) for n(t) < εσ−1/κ
η(1+β(µ−1))n(t)
β(µ−1)+(β(µ−1)κL−ηεσ−1)n(t)
≡ ϕA(n(t)) for n(t) > εσ−1/κ
, (37)
which uses (18).33 Function ϕN is linear, ϕA is concave, and both are increasing in n(t),
each of which has a unique fixed point for n(t) > 0, labeled n∗ and n∗∗, respectively.
With a slight modification to the conditions, Proposition 1 continues to hold at least
locally. (A proof requires a tedious sequence of similar calculations, which is omitted
here.)34 Suppose
L >
1− η
κ
(
1 +
1
β(µ− 1)
)
+
1
β(µ− 1)
≡ L′0,
32To ensure feasibility, such that ρ(t+1) ∈ (0, 1) for any n(t), it would suffice to assume β (µ− 1)κL−(
(β (µ− 1) + κ/εσ−1 + 1
)
< ηεσ−1 < β (µ− 1)κL.
33We also use A(t + 1) = A(t) for n(t) < εσ−1/κ and N(t + 1) = ηN(t) for n(t) > εσ−1/κ.
To ensure n(t + 1) > 0 for any n(t) > εσ−1/κ, we impose an upper bound of ε, such that ε <
[(κ/η)β (µ− 1)L]1/(σ−1).
34A formal proof is available upon request from the authors.
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to avoid the trivial case likewise. Then, we can revise Lemma 4 as follows: Under the
coexistence of endogenous and exogenous innovation, there exists a threshold value of
ε, ε′+, such that Θ/(1 − η) > ε
σ−1/κ holds for 1 < ε < ε′+, and Θ/(1 − η) ≤ ε
σ−1/κ for
ε ≥ ε′+.
35 This shows that if (and only if) the consumer’s love of novelty ε is sufficiently
strong, there is a locally stable trap, n∗. Once the economy falls into the new product
development regime, the economy is trapped and converging to the situation, n∗, in which
there is no innovation.
Concerning the existing product development regime, there are two possibilities. First,
if n∗∗ exists outside this regime, the equilibrium behavior of the economy is quite similar to
that in the original model. That is, when n∗ > εσ−1/κ, the economy achieves innovation
and growth perpetually through irregular cycles of new and existing product development
(Figure 4a). Otherwise, that is, if n∗ < εσ−1/κ, the economy is fatally caught in a globally
stable trap, n∗, called a global trap (Figure 4b).
Second, if n∗∗ is included in the existing product development regime, it may work
as a globally stable steady state (Figure 5a). This case is for n∗ > εσ−1/κ. At point
n∗∗, the number of new goods, N(t), and that of old goods, A(t), grow at the same rate.
Therefore, in this case, any path starting from any initial state converges to point n∗∗ that
provides the economy balanced growth, similar to the standard growth model. Figure 5b
depicts another interesting case where n∗ < εσ−1/κ. There are two locally stable steady
states, and whether the economy converges to a balanced growth path, n∗∗, or a locally
stable trap, n∗, depends on the initial condition. So-called path dependence implies that
the economy may suffer from a lock-in by virtue of historical events (e.g., Arthur 1989).
We call this sort of trap a local trap.
In summary, we demonstrate that the minor change leads to drastically different
equilibrium behaviors of the economy such as balanced growth and path dependence;
however, the message in our main results does not alter: A too strong love of novelty,
and a too weak love of novelty, negatively affect innovation and growth in the long run.
5.2 Departing from a One-period Monopoly
The purpose of the second extension is to relax the assumption of a one-period monopoly.
To achieve this goal, we consider a stochastic process through which firms can obtain long-
lived monopoly power. Specifically, we assume that if an R&D firm that invents a new
good in period t invests z(t)/A(t) units of labor in existing product development,36 it
will survive with long-lived monopoly power from period t + 1 onward at a probability
of s(t + 1) = s(z(t)) ∈ [0, 1]. At the probability of 1 − s(t + 1), the firm fails to obtain
long-lived monopoly power and exits. We consider a simple linear survival function such
as s(z) = ψz with z ≥ 0; see Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Eicher and Garc´ıa-
Pen˜alosa (2008) for R&D-based growth models with this type of endogenous survival of
innovations.37 Here, ψ > 0 is a productivity parameter. Because s(z) is a probability,
s(z) ≤ 1 must hold, and thus z ≤ 1/ψ. The law of motion governing the evolution of the
35Notably, ε′− and ε
′
+ are solutions to the quadratic equation in ε, given by Θ/(1−η) = ε
σ−1/κ, noting
n∗ = Θ/(1− η). They are almost the same as ε− and ε+ in Lemma 4.
36Alternatively, if we consider that an arbitrarily chosen outside firm makes this investment, the
equilibrium conditions would not alter.
37See also Furukawa (2013) and Niwa (2018) for more recent papers. In this section, we use the
modelling specification of firms’ endogenous survival developed by these two papers.
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Figure 5: Balanced Growth and Path Dependency
old goods A(t) is, thus, given by
A(t+ 1) = A(t) + s(t+ 1)N(t). (38)
The discounted present value of a new good (or a firm inventing a new good) can be
described as the following Bellman equation:
V n(t) = max
z(t)
[
pin(t)−
w(t)z(t)
A(t)
+ s(t+ 1)
V a(t+ 1)
1 + r(t)
]
(39)
subject to s(t+1) = ψz(t) ∈ (0, 1). The discounted present value of a successfully survived
firm follows the following Bellman equation:
V a(t) = pia(t) +
V a(t+ 1)
1 + r(t)
. (40)
Solving optimization in (39), there are three kinds of equilibrium: (i) the value of an old
good satisfies
W˜ a(t) ≡ ψ
V a(t+ 1)
1 + r(t)
−
w(t)
A(t)
= 0 (41)
for 0 < z(t) < 1/ψ; (ii) z(t) = 1/ψ holds with W˜ a(t) ≥ 0; and (iii) z(t) = 0 holds with
W˜ a(t) ≤ 0. Free entry for new product development ensures
W n(t) ≡
V n(t+ 1)
1 + r(t)
−
w(t)
A(t)
= 0 (42)
for N(t+ 1) > 0.
Here we restrict our analysis to the more interesting interior-solution case, (i), in
which new and existing product development coexist; N(t+ 1) > 0 and 1 < z(t) < 1/ψ.
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Conditions (41) and (42) imply that the balanced values of new and old goods, ψV a(t) =
V n(t), hold as long as 0 < z(t) < 1/ψ. The following labor market clearing condition
closes this extended model:
L =
1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
+
z(t)N(t)
A(t)
+
N(t+ 1)
A(t)
, (43)
which is basically analogous to (21) except that the aggregate use of labor for exist-
ing product development now depends on each firm’s endogenous decision, z(t). Using
(38)–(43), we can show that the equilibrium dynamical system in terms of the rate of
innovation, g(t) ≡ (A(t+ 1)− A(t))/A(t), is as follows.38
1 + g(t+ 1) =
εσ−1
εσ−1 − ψ
[
(1 + ψL+ βψ)−
εσ−1
εσ−1 − ψ
βψ (1 + ψL)
1 + g(t)
]
. (44)
Using (44), we can straightforwardly prove the following: In the interior case of
0 < z(t) < 1/ψ, for any given g(t) on an equilibrium path, the equilibrium rate of
innovation g(t+1) can be an inverted U-shaped function in the love of novelty ε. To ver-
ify this, we define ε˜ ≡ εσ−1/ (εσ−1 − ψ) and ε∗ ≡ (1 + β + ψL) (1 + g(t)) /(2β (1 + ψL))
for descriptive convenience. Then, (44) becomes
1 + g(t+ 1) = ε˜
[
(1 + β + ψL)−
β (1 + ψL)
1 + g(t)
ε˜
]
. (45)
Differentiating (45), g(t+1) increases (decreases) with ε˜ for ε˜ ∈ (0, ε∗) (for ε˜ ∈ (ε∗, 2ε∗)).
Therefore, an inverted U-shaped relationship is observed between ε˜ and g(t + 1), and
the maximum point is ε∗. Because ε˜ is decreasing in ε and the feasible domain of ε˜ is
(1,∞) (resulting from ε ∈ (ψ,∞)), we can straightforwardly show that the relationship
between ε and g(t + 1) is also an inverted U-shape for the feasible range of ε if ε∗ > 1.
This inequality holds for any g(t) > 0 if 1+β+ψL > 2β (1 + ψL) , which holds when, for
instance, ψ is sufficiently small. To conclude, in the general case in which a monopoly can
last longer than one period, the love of novelty can have an inverted-U effect on innovation
and growth. This result confirms our main message that the role of the public’s love of
novelty in innovation and growth is ambiguous.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we explore the role of people’s love of novelty in innovation and innovation-
based growth by developing an innovation-based growth model in which the role of con-
sumers’ love of novelty in aggregate innovation can be addressed. In the model, inno-
vation is the combination of two types of innovations, new product development and
existing product development; additionally, the infinitely-lived representative consumer
has a particular preference for new products (compared with old products), in addition to
the standard love-of-variety preferences. Using this model, we show that the consumer’s
love of novelty can be a source of innovation and long-run growth when moderate. Then,
we demonstrate a mechanism through which the love of novelty can cause underdevelop-
ment traps that result in less innovations when its level is too weak or too strong. Thus,
we conclude that people’s love of novelty might have an ambiguous effect: too weak and
too strong love for novelty can depress innovation and innovation-driven growth.
38See Appendix B for a proof on the derivations of (44).
23
References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. “Institutions as a fun-
damental cause of long-term growth,” Handbook of Economic Growth, 1A: 386–464
(2005).
[2] Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hemous. “The
environment and directed technical change,” American Economic Review, 102: 131–
166 (2012).
[3] Acs, Z., and M. Sanders. “Patents, knowledge spillovers, and entrepreneurship,”
Small Business Economics, 39: 801–17 (2012).
[4] Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt. “A model of growth through creative destruc-
tion,” Econometrica, 60: 323–351 (1992).
[5] Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt. “Research and development in the growth pro-
cess,” Journal of Economic Growth, 1: 49–73 (1996).
[6] Aghion, Philippe, and Xavier Jarave. “Knowledge spillovers, innovation and growth,”
Economic Journal, 125: 533—573 (2015).
[7] Akiyama, Taro. R&D, entrepreneurship, and growth.” manuscript (2009).
[8] Alesina, Alberto, and Paola Giuliano. “The power of the family,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Growth, 15: 93–125 (2010).
[9] Anderlini, Luca , Leonardo Felli, Giovanni Immordino, and Alessandro Riboni. “Le-
gal institutions, innovation and growth,” International Economic Review, 54: 937–
956 (2013).
[10] Arthur, W. Brian. “Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by his-
torical events,” Economic Journal 99: 116–131 (1989).
[11] Ashraf, Quamrul, and Oded Galor. “Cultural assimilation, cultural diffusion and the
origin of the wealth of nations.” CEPR Discussion Papers No. 6444 (2007).
[12] Ashraf, Quamrul, and Oded Galor. “The ‘Out of Africa’ hypothesis, human ge-
netic diversity, and comparative economic development,” American Economic Re-
view, 103: 1–46 (2013a).
[13] Ashraf, Quamrul, and Oded Galor. “Genetic diversity and the origins of cultural
fragmentation,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 103: 528–533
(2013b).
[14] Ashraf, Quamrul, and Oded Galor. “The macrogenoeconomics of comparative de-
velopment,” Journal of Economic Literature, forthcoming (2017).
[15] Barber, Bernard. “Resistance by scientists to scientific discovery,” Science, 134: 596–
602 (1961).
[16] Barro, Robert, and Jong-Wha Lee. “A new data set of educational attainment in
the world, 1950-2010,” Journal of Development Economics, 104: 184-198 (2013).
24
[17] Be´nabou, Roland, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. “Religion and innovation,”
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 105: 346–351 (2015).
[18] Be´nabou, Roland, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni. “Forbidden fruits: The political
economy of science, religion, and growth,” NBER Working Paper Series, 21105
(2016). Available at:
https://www.princeton.edu/˜rbenabou/papers/Religion%20July%202016%20new.pdf
(accessed on August 29, 2017).
[19] Benhabib, Jess, Jesse Perla, and Christopher Tonetti. “Reconciling models of dif-
fusion and innovation: A theory of the productivity distribution and technology
frontier, NBER Working Paper No. 23095 (2017).
[20] Bento, Pedro. “Quantifying the effects of patent protection on innovation, imitation,
growth, and aggregate productivity, ”mimeo (2018).
[21] Beveridge, William Ian Beardmore. The Art of Scientific Investigation, Random
House, New York (1959).
[22] Boserup, Ester. The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian
Change under Population Pressure, Chicago: Aldine (1965).
[23] Chu, Angus C. “Confidence-enhanced economic growth,” The B.E. Journal of
Macroeconomics (Topics), 7: Article 13 (2007).
[24] Chu, Angus C, and Guido Cozzi. “Cultural preference on fertility and the growth
and welfare effects of intellectual property rights,” MPRA Paper No. 31283 (2011).
[25] Chu, Angus C., and Yuichi Furukawa. “Patentability and knowledge spillovers of
basic R&D,” Southern Economic Journal, 79: 928–945 (2013).
[26] Chu, Angus C., Guido Cozzi, and Silvia Galli. “Does intellectual monopoly stimulate
or stifle innovation?” European Economic Review, 56: 727–746 (2012).
[27] Chu, Angus C., Guido Cozzi, Shiyuan Pan, and Mengbo Zhang. “Do stronger patents
stimulate or stifle innovation? The crucial role of financial development,” MPRA
Paper No. 73630 (2016).
[28] Cloninger, Claude R. “A unified biosocial theory of personality and its role in the
development of anxiety states,” Psychiatric Developments 4: 167–226 (1986).
[29] Cohen, Wesley M. and Daniel A. Levinthal. “Innovation and learning: The two faces
of R&D,” Economic Journal, 99: 569–596 (1989).
[30] Cozzi, Guido. “Culture as a bubble,” Journal of Political Economy, 106: 376–394
(1998).
[31] Cozzi, Guido, and Silvia Galli. “Science-based R&D in Schumpeterian growth,” Scot-
tish Journal of Political Economy, 56, 474–491 (2009).
[32] Cozzi, Guido, and Silvia Galli. “Privatization of knowledge: Did the U.S. get it
right?” Economics Working Paper Series 1307, University of St. Gallen, School of
Economics and Political Science (2013).
25
[33] Cozzi, Guido, and Silvia Galli. “Sequential R&D and blocking patents in the dy-
namics of growth,” Journal of Economic Growth, 19: 183–219 (2014).
[34] Dastidar, Krishnendu G., and Makoto Yano. “Corruption, market quality and entry
deterrence in emerging economies,” RIETI Discussion Paper Series 17-E-010 (2017).
[35] Deneckere, Raymond and Kenneth Judd. “Cyclical and chaotic behavior in a dy-
namic equilibrium model,” in Cycles and Chaos in Economic Equilibrium, ed. by
Jess Benhabib. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1992).
[36] Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs, and Steel, New York: W. W. Norton (1997).
[37] Dinopoulos, Elias, and Syropoulos, Constantinos. “Rent protection as a barrier to
innovation and growth,” Economic Theory, 32: 309–332 (2007).
[38] Doepke, Matthias, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. “Culture, entrepreneurship, and growth,”
Handbook of Economic Growth, 2A: 1-48 (2014).
[39] Doi, Junko, and Kazuo Mino. “A variety-expansion model of growth with exter-
nal habit formation,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32: 3055–3083
(2008).
[40] Eicher, Theo, and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa, Cecilia. “Endogenous strength of intellectual
property rights: Implications for economic development and growth,” European Eco-
nomic Review, 52: 237–258 (2008).
[41] Evans, Lewis, Neil Quigley, and Jie Zhang. “Optimal price regulation in a growth
model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods,” Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 36: 463–474 (2003).
[42] Fagerberg, Jan. “Innovation: A guide to the literature,” in Oxford Handbook of
Innovation, ed. by J. Fagerberg, D. Mowery, and R. Nelson: Oxford University
Press (2006).
[43] Fagerberg, Jan. “Innovation: A new guide,” Working Paper, University of Oslo, Aal-
borg University, and Lund University (2013). Available at:
http:// www.sv.uio.no/tik/InnoWP/tik working paper 19112013.pdf (accessed on
August 29, 2017).
[44] Francois, Patrick, and Shouyong Shi. “Innovation, growth, and welfare-improving
cycles,” Journal of Economic Theory, 85: 226–57 (1999).
[45] Furukawa, Yuichi. “The struggle to survive in the R&D sector: Implications for
innovation and growth,” Economics Letters, 121: 26–29 (2013).
[46] Furukawa, Yuichi. “Leapfrogging cycles in international competition,” Economic
Theory, 59: 401–433 (2015).
[47] Furukawa, Yuichi, Tat-kei Lai, and Kenji Sato. “Novelty-seeking traits and innova-
tion,” RIETI Discussion Paper Series 18-E-073 (2018).
[48] Furukawa, Yuichi, Tat-kei Lai, and Kenji Sato. “Novelty-seeking traits and applied
research activities,” Applied Economics Letters, forthcoming (2019).
26
[49] Gale, Douglas. “Delay and cycles,” Review of Economic Studies, 63: 169–98 (1996).
[50] Galor, Oded, and Stelios Michalopoulos. “Evolution and the growth process: Natu-
ral selection of entrepreneurial traits.” Journal of Economic Theory, 147: 759–780
(2012).
[51] Galor, Oded, and Omer Moav. “Natural selection and the origin of economic
growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117: 1133–1192 (2002).
[52] Gilbert, Richard, and Carl Shapiro. “Optimal patent length and breadth,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 21: 106–112 (1990).
[53] Goh, A.-T., and J. Olivier. “Optimal patent protection in a two-sector economy,”
International Economic Review, 43: 1191–1214 (2002).
[54] Go¨ren, Erkan. “The persistent effects of novelty-seeking traits on comparative eco-
nomic development,” Journal of Development Economics, 126: 112–126 (2017).
[55] Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1991).
[56] Hall, Bronwyn H., Adam Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg. “The NBER patent cita-
tions data file: Lessons, insights and methodological tools,”NBER Working Papers
No. 8498 (2001).
[57] Iwaisako, Tatsuro, and Koichi Futagami. “Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an
endogenous growth model,”Journal of Economic Theory, 132: 306–334 (2007).
[58] Iwaisako, Tatsuro, and Koichi Futagami. “Patent protection, capital accumulation,
and economic growth,” Economic Theory, 52: 631–668 (2013).
[59] Iwaisako, Tatsuro, and Hitoshi Tanaka. “Product cycles and growth cycles,”Journal
of International Economics, 105: 22–40 (2017).
[60] Jones, Charles I. “Time series tests of endogenous growth models,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 110: 495–525 (1995).
[61] Judd, Kenneth L. “On the performance of patents,” Econometrica, 53: 567–586
(1985).
[62] Konishi, Kunihiko. “Basic and applied research: A welfare analysis.” Japanese Eco-
nomic Review, 69: 414–437 (2018).
[63] Kremer, Michael. “Population growth and technological change: One million B.C.
to 1990,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108: 681–716 (1993).
[64] Li, Chol.-Won. “On the policy implications of endogenous technological progress,”
Economic Journal, 111: C164–C179 (2001).
[65] Lucas, Robert. E., and Benjamin Moll “Knowledge growth and the allocation of
time.” Journal of Political Economy, 122: 1–51 (2014).
[66] Matsuyama, Kiminori. “Growing through cycles,” Econometrica, 67: 335–47 (1999).
27
[67] Matsuyama, Kiminori. “Growing through cycles in an infinitely lived agent econ-
omy,” Journal of Economic Theory, 100: 220–34 (2001).
[68] Michelacci, Claudio. “Low returns in R&D due to the lack of entrepreneurial skills,”
Economic Journal, 113: 207–25 (2003).
[69] Middendorf, William H. What every engineer should know about inventing, New
York: Marcel Dekker (1981).
[70] Mokyr, Joel. “Technological inertia in economic history,” Journal of Economic His-
tory, 52: 325–338 (1992).
[71] Mokyr, Joel. “Innovation and its enemies: The economic and political roots of tech-
nological inertia,” in A Not-so-dismal Science: A Broader View of Economies and
Societies, ed. by Mancur Olson and Satu Kahkohnen. Oxford: Oxford University
Press (2000 (1996, DP)).
[72] Mokyr, Joel. The gifts of Athena: Historical origins of the knowledge economy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2004).
[73] Mokyr, Joel. “Long-term economic growth and the history of technology,” Handbook
of Economic Growth, 1B: 1114–1174 (2005).
[74] Niwa, Sumiko. “Effects of a blocking patent on R&D with endogenous survival ac-
tivities,” Journal of Economics, forthcoming (2018).
[75] OECD/Eurostat. Oslo Manual 2018: Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and Using
Data on Innovation, 4th Edition, The Measurement of Scientific, Technological and
Innovation Activities, OECD Publishing, Paris/Eurostat, Luxembourg (2018).
[76] Park, Walter G. “International patent protection: 1960-2005,” Research Policy, 37:
761–766 (2008).
[77] Romer, Paul. M. “Endogenous technological change,” Journal of Political Economy,
98: S71–S102 (1990).
[78] Segerstrom, Paul, T. C. A. Anant, and Elias Dinopoulos. “A Schumpeterian Model
of the Product Life Cycle, ” American Economic Review, 80: 1077-91 (1990).
[79] Shleifer, Andrei. “Implementation cycles,” Journal of Political Economy, 94: 1163–
1190 (1986).
[80] Tabellini, Guido. “Culture and institutions: Economic development in the regions
of Europe,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 8: 677–716 (2010).
[81] Yano, Makoto. “The foundation of market quality economics,” Japanese Economic
Review, 60: 1–32 (2009).
[82] Yano, Makoto, and Yuichi Furukawa. “Two-dimensional constrained chaos and time
in innovation: An analysis of industrial revolution cycles,” RIETI Discussion Paper
Series 19-E-008 (2019).
28
Appendix A: Cross-country Relationships Between Love
of Novelty, Innovation, and Originality
In this Appendix, we document some suggestive evidence regarding the country-level
relationships between Love of novelty, Innovation, and Originality.
Data and variables To measure the “Love of novelty” of the people of a country, we
use data from Question E046 of the World Values Survey (WVS). This survey question
asks respondents to score this statement, “Ideas stood test of time better vs New ideas
better.” The score ranges from 1 (“Ideas that stood test of time are generally best”)
to 10 (“New ideas are generally better than old ones”). To construct the country-level
measure, we collapse the WVS sample with valid responses to E046 into country-level
means. This variable is also used by Be´nabou et al. (2015) to measure people’s general
openness to novelty.
We use patent data from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and
population data from the World Bank to construct several measures of innovation, in-
cluding Patent applications per million capita in log, Trademark applications per million
capita in log, Industrial design applications per million capita in log, and Scientific and
technical journal articles per million capita in log.39 As an alternative measure of inno-
vation, we also use the Global Innovation Index.40
Our “Originality” variable measures a country’s “original” patents relative to the
“benchmark” U.S. patent within the same patent class and granting year. Specifically,
we use the NBER patent data from Hall et al. (2001) to construct this variable. The
NBER patent database contains a measure of originality for each patent granted between
1973 and 1999, defined as:41
1−
J∑
j=1
(
Citations made which belong to patent class j
Total citations made
)2
. (A1)
This measure takes a high value when a patent cites other patents that belong to a wide
range of patent classes but a low value when only citing other patents that belong to a
narrow range of patent classes. For each patent class and granting year, we identify the
“benchmark” as the median value of the above measure in (A1) for U.S. patents. For
each patent, we compute the difference between the patent’s originality measure in (A1)
and the U.S. benchmark. Then our Originality index for a country is the average of this
difference; when a country has a higher Originality index, then this country’s patents
tend to be more original than the U.S. benchmarks.
In the next subsection, we report the unconditional relationships between Love of nov-
elty, Innovation, and Originality. We also estimate several simple ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions with additional country-level controls, including log GDP per capita,
39More specifically, Patent applications per million capita for a country is computed as the sum of the
country’s patent applications over 2010–2015 divided by the country’s average population over 2010–2015.
The other measures are computed in a similar way.
40For each country, we take the average of non-missing values over 2011-2015 as its Global Innovation
Index.
41See Bento (2018) for a recent study that also uses Hall et al.’s (2001) originality measure. Notably,
his focus is quite different from ours, and particularly on the effects of patent protection on patent
originality.
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log Population, intellectual property protection, years of tertiary schooling, net inflow
of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, and religiosity (share of religious
people and share of people believing in God).42 Data for GDP per capita are from the
World Bank; data for the net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage
of GDP are from the World Development Index (WDI); the index of patent rights comes
from Park (2008); data for years of tertiary schooling are from Barro and Lee (2013).
To construct the two measures of religiosity, we use the survey questions F034 and F050
of WVS. More specifically, F034 asks whether the respondent is a religious person (the
survey question is: “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you
are ...” with possible answers 1 (“A religious person”), 2 (“Not a religious person”), and 3
(“A convinced atheist”).) F050 asks whether the respondent believes in god (the survey
question is: “Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? ... God” with possible
answers 0 (“No”) and 1 (“Yes”).) Notably, the control variables are country-level means
between 1990 and 2010 except that the two religiosity measures are means between 1981
and 2002. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the various variables used.43
Results and discussions We first examine the relationship between Love of novelty
and Innovation. Figure 6(a) to Figure 6(e) show the scatter plots of the country-level
means of E046 of WVS against the five different aforementioned innovation measures. In
each scatter plot, the line is a fitted quadratic curve. In these various scatter plots, we
observe an inverted-U relationship between Love of novelty and Innovation: Innovation
is lower when Love of novelty is either very weak or very strong. These relationships are
all statistically significant. The aforementioned relationships are purely unconditional.
We also estimate a set of OLS regressions by including various country-level control
variables. These results are reported in Tables 2 to 6, respectively. We find that the
inverted-U relationship is significant (except when the Global Innovation Index is the
outcome variable).
Next, we examine the relationship between Love of novelty and Originality. Figure
6(f) shows a scatter plot of the country-level means of E046 of WVS against our Original-
ity measure. The linear fitted line has a positive slope (but is statistically insignificant).
In Table 7, we also estimate a set of OLS regressions. We find that, when other con-
trol variables are included (in Columns (2) to (4)), Love of novelty is positively and
significantly related to Originality.
Overall, there seems to be an inverted-U relationship between Love of novelty and
Innovation and a positive relationship between Love of novelty and Originality. Nev-
ertheless, we are aware of various limitations of the empirical analysis. For instance,
one major concern is regarding the measurement of “love of novelty.” In the empirical
analysis, we use data from the WVS to construct the country-level love of novelty index.
We can argue that answers to such types of survey questions do not necessarily provide
an accurate measure of the extent to which consumers love new products. One further
question is whether these answers can be compared across countries; this comparison
is especially relevant in our case because we cannot control for country-level differences
through country fixed-effects in our country-level regressions. An even more challenging
concern is whether the relationships we observe are causal. Without a credible instrument
that is correlated with people’s love of novelty but is not correlated with other factors that
42These control variables are also used in Be´nabou et al. (2016).
43Notably, this variable has an outlier (for Colombia); its value is 8.210, whereas the maximum value
of the remaining countries is approximately 6.185. In the results reported, this outlier is excluded.
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can potentially affect innovation activities, we cannot show that love of novelty causally
affects innovation activities.
Although these empirical concerns are important, it is beyond the scope of this study
to address them. Therefore, we emphasize that the empirical results reported in this
Appendix should be interpreted as suggestive evidence in line with the predictions of the
theoretical predictions of our model.
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Figure 6: Scatter plots
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean S.D. Min. 1st Q. Median 3rd Q. Max.
Patent applications 43 5.622 2.092 −0.090 4.766 5.820 7.039 9.807
per million capita in log
Trademark applications 43 8.606 0.950 5.812 8.198 8.790 9.316 10.194
per million capita in log
Industrial design applications 43 5.245 2.061 −2.540 4.163 5.667 6.483 8.894
per million capita in log
Sci. and tech. journal articles 43 7.599 1.719 2.865 6.816 8.108 8.950 9.661
per million capita in log
Global Innovation Index 43 43.721 10.521 23.700 35.800 41.700 53.800 68.300
Originality 43 −0.103 0.100 −0.500 −0.144 −0.101 −0.075 0.233
E046 of WVS 43 5.065 0.563 3.767 4.563 5.201 5.457 6.185
GDP per capita in log 43 9.140 1.150 6.713 8.163 9.098 10.222 11.275
Population in log 43 2.997 1.644 0.343 1.644 2.717 4.146 7.133
Index of patent rights 35 3.458 0.673 2.382 2.936 3.250 4.074 4.840
Years of tertiary schooling 31 43.868 20.138 10.280 28.860 40.300 59.700 79.640
FDI (as % of GDP) 43 3.768 3.473 0.142 1.860 2.921 4.293 21.356
% religious people 43 0.659 0.195 0.160 0.556 0.708 0.804 0.949
% people believing in God 41 0.811 0.166 0.424 0.672 0.856 0.960 0.996
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Table 2: The relationship between Love of novelty and Innovation (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Love of novelty 18.756∗∗∗ 7.912 12.661∗∗ 9.268∗
(6.579) (5.023) (5.018) (4.792)
(Love of novelty)2 −2.016∗∗∗ −0.942∗ −1.362∗∗∗ −1.024∗∗
(0.655) (0.496) (0.502) (0.477)
GDP per capita (log) 0.843∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.284) (0.254)
Population (log) 0.411∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗
(0.166) (0.123) (0.128)
Index of patent rights 0.537 0.318 0.479
(0.401) (0.392) (0.345)
Years of tertiary schooling 0.018 0.023∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
FDI (as % of GDP) 0.042 0.001 −0.072
(0.104) (0.081) (0.079)
% religious people −2.841∗∗∗
(0.829)
% people believing in God −2.958∗∗∗
(0.927)
Constant −37.030∗∗ −21.679∗ −31.195∗∗∗ −22.430∗∗
(16.351) (12.432) (11.737) (11.265)
Observations 43 31 31 29
R2 0.265 0.842 0.881 0.900
Note: The dependent variable is Patent applications per million capita in log. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗: significance
at 1% level.
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Table 3: The relationship between Love of novelty and Innovation (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Love of novelty 12.526∗∗∗ 9.278∗∗∗ 11.232∗∗∗ 10.330∗∗∗
(2.953) (2.900) (2.924) (2.885)
(Love of novelty)2 −1.250∗∗∗ −0.948∗∗∗ −1.120∗∗∗ −1.033∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.283) (0.286) (0.282)
GDP per capita (log) 0.503∗∗ 0.439∗ 0.458∗∗
(0.228) (0.231) (0.221)
Population (log) 0.021 0.044 −0.015
(0.089) (0.071) (0.077)
Index of patent rights −0.266 −0.356 −0.310
(0.286) (0.283) (0.276)
Years of tertiary schooling 0.006 0.008 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
FDI (as % of GDP) 0.098 0.081 0.056
(0.074) (0.067) (0.069)
% religious people −1.168∗∗
(0.472)
% people believing in God −0.989
(0.628)
Constant −22.391∗∗∗ −17.986∗∗ −21.900∗∗∗ −19.595∗∗∗
(7.210) (6.999) (6.686) (6.558)
Observations 43 31 31 29
R2 0.230 0.698 0.735 0.748
Note: The dependent variable is Trademark applications per million capita in log. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗:
significance at 1% level.
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Table 4: The relationship between Love of novelty and Innovation (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Love of novelty 16.938∗∗∗ 6.281 16.384∗∗ 18.186∗∗∗
(6.250) (10.277) (7.566) (5.579)
(Love of novelty)2 −1.766∗∗∗ −0.739 −1.632∗∗ −1.847∗∗∗
(0.607) (1.007) (0.759) (0.552)
GDP per capita (log) 0.747∗∗ 0.416 0.501
(0.363) (0.319) (0.323)
Population (log) 0.072 0.195 0.067
(0.211) (0.164) (0.163)
Index of patent rights 0.940∗ 0.475 0.474
(0.540) (0.396) (0.384)
Years of tertiary schooling −0.030 −0.019 −0.016
(0.019) (0.016) (0.014)
FDI (as % of GDP) 0.001 −0.086 −0.103
(0.149) (0.134) (0.119)
% religious people −6.044∗∗∗
(2.232)
% people believing in God −3.351∗∗
(1.404)
Constant −34.685∗∗ −16.371 −36.613∗∗ −41.421∗∗∗
(15.812) (24.429) (17.903) (12.661)
Observations 43 31 31 29
R2 0.136 0.369 0.530 0.665
Note: The dependent variable is Industrial design applications per million capita in log. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗:
significance at 1% level.
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Table 5: The relationship between Love of novelty and Innovation (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Love of novelty 28.827∗∗∗ 19.842∗∗∗ 20.307∗∗∗ 19.741∗∗∗
(4.930) (4.053) (4.105) (4.309)
(Love of novelty)2 −2.944∗∗∗ −2.061∗∗∗ −2.102∗∗∗ −2.041∗∗∗
(0.494) (0.395) (0.398) (0.419)
GDP per capita (log) 1.053∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.309) (0.296)
Population (log) 0.171∗ 0.177∗ 0.164
(0.101) (0.097) (0.103)
Index of patent rights 0.054 0.032 0.058
(0.377) (0.377) (0.362)
Years of tertiary schooling 0.001 0.001 −0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
FDI (as % of GDP) 0.139∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.121∗
(0.070) (0.070) (0.068)
% religious people −0.278
(0.551)
% people believing in God −0.595
(0.551)
Constant −61.975∗∗∗ −50.279∗∗∗ −51.210∗∗∗ −49.606∗∗∗
(12.171) (9.381) (9.500) (9.950)
Observations 43 31 31 29
R2 0.427 0.905 0.906 0.910
Note: The dependent variable is Scientific and technical journal articles per million capita in log. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level;
∗∗∗: significance at 1% level.
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Table 6: The relationship between Love of novelty and Innovation (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Love of novelty 116.348∗∗∗ 13.917 34.502 14.254
(28.577) (26.129) (28.068) (23.452)
(Love of novelty)2 −11.693∗∗∗ −1.755 −3.573 −1.699
(2.812) (2.533) (2.669) (2.223)
GDP per capita (log) 5.201∗∗∗ 4.528∗∗∗ 4.985∗∗∗
(1.225) (1.453) (1.261)
Population (log) 0.224 0.475 −0.533
(0.797) (0.702) (0.672)
Index of patent rights 5.799∗∗∗ 4.851∗∗∗ 5.735∗∗∗
(1.827) (1.676) (1.590)
Years of tertiary schooling −0.003 0.018 0.020
(0.069) (0.079) (0.064)
FDI (as % of GDP) 0.357 0.180 −0.068
(0.631) (0.485) (0.480)
% religious people −12.315∗∗
(5.419)
% people believing in God −3.404
(5.654)
Constant −241.981∗∗∗ −49.802 −91.048 −45.619
(71.391) (64.658) (67.642) (57.965)
Observations 43 31 31 29
R2 0.164 0.846 0.875 0.889
Note: The dependent variable is Global Innovation Index. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ∗: significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗: significance at 1% level.
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Table 7: The relationship between Love of novelty and Originality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Love of novelty 0.016 0.032∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.013∗
(0.029) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
GDP per capita (log) 0.009 0.012∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Population (log) 0.009∗ 0.007∗ 0.007∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Index of patent rights 0.012 0.017∗ 0.016∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Years of tertiary schooling −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FDI (as % of GDP) 0.004 0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% religious people 0.058∗∗
(0.023)
% people believing in God 0.112∗∗∗
(0.022)
Constant −0.184 −0.426∗∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.098) (0.084) (0.080)
Observations 43 31 31 29
R2 0.008 0.397 0.488 0.611
Note: The dependent variable is Originality. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗:
significance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗∗∗: significance at 1% level.
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Appendix B: Proof for (44)
Solving the maximization problem in (39), the first order condition gives rise to
ψ
V a(t+ 1)
1 + r(t)
=
w(t)
A(t)
, (B1)
which must hold in the interior-solution equilibrium where z(t) ∈ (0, 1/ψ). Incorporating
(B1) for (39) and (40) yields
V n(t) = pin(t) (B2a)
and
V a(t) = pia(t) +
w(t)
A(t)
, (B2b)
respectively.
Together with these conditions on innovation values, we will derive the equilibrium dy-
namical system of the extended model (for the interior-solution case). First, substituting
(B2a) and (B2b) into the balanced value condition ψV a(t) = V n(t), we obtain
E(t)
w(t)
=
ψ
εσ−1 − ψ
µ
µ− 1
A(t) + εσ−1N(t)
A(t)
, (B3)
which uses (12), (14), and (20) for the expressions of profits, pin(t) and pia(t). To proceed,
we need to assume εσ−1 > ψ since E(t)/w(t) must be positive. Second, substituting
(B2a) into the free entry condition (42), we obtain
E(t)
w(t)
=
1
βεσ−1
µ
µ− 1
A(t+ 1) + εσ−1N(t+ 1)
A(t)
, (B4)
which uses the Euler equation (9), (12) and (20). Finally, incorporating (38) for the labor
market equilibrium condition (43), with s(t+ 1) = ψz(t), we obtain
E(t)
w(t)
= µ
[
L−
1
ψ
A(t+ 1)− A(t)
A(t)
−
N(t+ 1)
A(t)
]
. (B5)
These three conditions, (B3)–(B5), govern the equilibrium dynamic behavior of our econ-
omy in the interior case of z(t) ∈ (0, 1/ψ). Specifically, these determine E(t)/w(t), A(t+
1), and N(t+ 1) as a function in A(t) and N(t).
Since our interest is in the dynamics of the growth rate, g(t) ≡ (A(t+1)−A(t))/A(t),
we rewrite (B3)–(B5) as follows. First, we use (B4) and (B5) to express N(t + 1) as a
function of g(t) and A(t):
N(t+ 1) = A(t)
1
ψ
[
(ψL+ 1) (β (µ− 1))
β (µ− 1) + 1
−
βεσ−1 (µ− 1) + ψ
εσ−1 (β (µ− 1) + 1)
(1 + g(t))
]
. (B6)
Using (B3) and (B4), then, we express 1+ g(t) as a function in A(t), N(t+1), and N(t):
1 + g(t) =
βψεσ−1
εσ−1 − ψ
(
1 + εσ−1
N(t)
A(t− 1)
1
1 + g(t− 1)
)
− εσ−1
N(t+ 1)
A(t)
, (B7)
which uses A(t) = A(t− 1) (1 + g(t− 1)). To eliminate N(t+1) and N(t) from (B7), we
use (B6), yielding (44).
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